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ABSTRACT 
Disclosures about new financial frauds and scandals are continually appearing in 
the press.  As a consequence, the accounting profession's traditional methods of 
monitoring corporate financial activities are under intense scrutiny.  At the same 
time, there is recognition that principles-based GAAP from the International 
Accounting Standards Board will become the recognized standard in the U.S.  The 
authors argue that these two factors will change the practices used to fight 
corporate malfeasance as investigators adapt the techniques of accounting into a 
forensic audit engagement model.  
Keywords: auditing, fraud examination, forensic audits, forensic accounting, 
financial reporting.  
1. DEFINING A FORENSIC AUDIT 
To successfully exercise good corporate governance, there is a need for internal 
controls and one aspect of these controls relates to financial oversight.  
Unfortunately the number of financial frauds that have been continually 
perpetrated within U.S. companies raises serious questions as to whether 
traditional financial controls are working.1  "Is the traditional audit model still 
                                                 
1 The 2002 accounting scandals include:  AOL, Adelphia, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Charter 
Communications, Computer Associates, Duke Energy, Dynegy, El Paso Corporation, 
Enron, Freddie Mac, Global Crossing, Halliburton, Harken Energy, HealthSouth, 
Lucent Technologies, Merrill Lynch, Quest Communications, Reliant Energy, 
Sunbeam, Tyco International, Waste Management, Inc. and World Com.  The 2003 
accounting scandals include: Royal Ahold Parmalat, and Calisto Tanzi.  The 2005 
accounting scandals include AIG. During 2006 and 2007, accounting scandals are 
related to the backdating of corporate stock options from companies such as Monster 
Worldwide, Inc.  Dell has been added to the list in 2007 as a result of a kickback 
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doing its share in providing oversight over financial activities?"  Today the answer 
might be, "not very well, but what other choice is there?"   Questions about the 
ability of the audit-reporting model to provide reasonable financial oversight and 
the broader acceptance of principles-based accounting methods have the potential 
to create a new approach to risk assurance.  This paper argues that forensic 
auditing, which is based on the practices of forensic accounting, is the best choice 
for reducing financial malfeasance in a principles-based accounting world.       
2. A PRINCIPLES-BASED WORLD IS COMING 
Forensic auditing is focused on the identification, interpretation, and 
communication of the evidence of underlying strategic economic and reporting 
events.2  It not single-event based, like a fraud examination, and a forensic audit is 
not used to render an audit opinion.  As such, forensic audits are easily adapted to a 
principles-based accounting environment with broad guidelines applied to a variety 
of accounting investigations without using rule-based audit approaches or more 
narrowly-focused fraud practices.     
Principles-based methods have been receiving more recognition as an alternative 
in U.S. accounting practices (Global Public Policy Symposium 2008; Shortridge 
and Myring 2004) as there has been an increased emphasis for more unified 
worldwide accounting practices.3  In the white paper, Principles-Based Accounting 
Standards (Global Public Policy Symposium 2008) a call is made by the Big Four 
along with Grant Thornton and BDO International for the adoption of "reasonable 
judgment" in the application of accounting principles.   
Principles-based generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are being 
developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).  Continued 
globalization of the business economy has resulted in the adoption of these 
accounting standards by 100 countries including five G8 countries along with 
plans for adoption by a number of other countries within the next five years.  The 
IASB's accounting standards, known as the International Financial Reporting 
                                                                                                                      
scheme.  Frauds growing out of the sub-prime mortgage meltdown in 2008 and 2009 
are too numerous to list. 
 
2 The Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued Release No. 2007-001 in 
January 2007.  The Release defines forensic accounting as operating outside the 
courtroom and applying "special skills in accounting, auditing, finance, quantitative 
methods, certain areas of the law, and research, and investigative skills to collect, 
analyze, and evaluate evidential matter and to interpret and communicate findings 
(Public Company Oversight Board 2007). 
3 Principles-based practices use the following criteria along with less detailed rule 
making: (Global Public Policy Symposium 2008): (1) Faithful presentation of economic 
reality; (2) Responsive to users' needs for clarity and transparency; (3) Consistency 
with a clear conceptual framework; (4) Based on an appropriately-defined scope that 
addresses a broad area of accounting; (5) Written in clear, concise and plain 
language; (6) Allows for the use of reasonable judgment.   
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Standards (IFRS), are being considered for adoption as GAAP in the United States 
by 2014.4  The SEC has been holding hearings to assess opinions about the timing 
and form of adoption in the United States.5  The IASB's standards do not use the 
detailed rule-based approach found in U.S. GAAP.  For example, U.S GAAP 
requires that a capital lease be recognized when the lease term is equal to or greater 
than 75% of the asset's economic life; while IFRS guidelines only require such 
treatment when the lease term is a "major part" of the asset's economic life.6  The 
term "major part" needs to be decided by the accountant.  Additionally, deferred 
taxes under U.S. GAAP are recognized in full; whereas under IFRS, they are 
recognized when it is "more likely than not" that they will be realized.7  Thus, the 
accountant's judgment is more dominant in evaluating the underlying nature of a 
financial transaction under international standards.      
These changes are expected to affect the rule-based formats used in U.S auditing 
and GAAP procedures as well as provide an opportunity for the implementation of 
forensic audits.  Forensic audits fit within a principles-based approach as they 
require the application of professional judgment to identify the underlying nature 
of unstructured and unreported financial transactions.  A forensic auditor must 
assess the underlying nature of transactions and apply a deductive mindset using 
professional judgment as the primary source for interpreting accounting events.  As 
the evaluation of accounting events becomes more strongly based on judgment, 
forensics has the potential of supporting such an approach by monitoring corporate 
activities for "economic reality" and "economic consequences." 8  Further, the 
implementation of principles-based methods under forensic auditing is likely to be 
more politically acceptable than trying to change decades of rules-based practices 
under U.S. auditing standards.  
3. LEGAL LIABILITY AND RULE-BASED PRACTICE 
The accountant's legal liabilities arising from the performance of audits had a 
                                                 
4 The SEC will allow certain domestic companies to use IFRS as early as December 31, 
2009.  The 2014 date for other companies may vary with specific SEC phrased-in 
timetable objectives.  
5 The most recent Securities and Exchange Commission Roundtable on the topic 
"Practical Issues Surrounding the Use of IFRS in the U.S. in Recent Years and its 
Potential Expanded Use in Future Years" was conducted in Washington, D.C. on 
December 17, 2007.  See: http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ifrsroadmap.htm 
6 The IASB and the FASB are reviewing the differences in their approaches to lease 
accounting as found in Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13, 
Accounting for Leases, and International Accounting Standard 17, Leases, 
respectively. To help overcome some of these differences, the FASB issued a 
Discussion Paper on March 19, 2009 (No. 1680-100) titled Leases:  Preliminary 
Views.      
7 See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109, Accounting for Income 
Taxes, and International Accounting Standard 12 Income Taxes. 
8 The Global Report (2008) views forensics as a means of measuring economic reality 
and projecting economic consequences of corporate events.     
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significant influence on the development of rule-based practices followed in the 
United States.  The purpose of rules-based accounting has been “to address as 
many potential contingencies as possible” (May 1937).   Still, company officials 
bent on defrauding stockholders have evaded these rules, and the accountant’s 
legal liabilities have not been diminished. 
Rule-based approaches have been slowly developed over the decades by 
accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies.  The result is a detailed set of 
rules that are used to cover almost every after-the-fact recognized or developing 
accounting problem and transaction.  This approach was not always practiced.  At 
one time, it was believed the subjective nature of accounting made the judgment of 
the accountant superior to a set of detailed rules for recording complex 
transactions.  George May, whose roots as an accountant were in the United 
Kingdom, believed the "substance of the accounts may and often should vary 
according to the purpose for which the accounts are required" (May 1950).9  May 
stated that "...no amount of standardization will either (a) make an understanding 
of the nature of accounting process less necessary to a proper interpretation of such 
determinations, or (b) convert those determinations into findings of fact" (May 
1950).   May’s arguments were not successful in influencing the direction taken by 
the accounting profession, and the application of GAAP and SASs changed a 
principles-based approach relying on the judgment of the accountant into a practice 
of closely following a set of detailed prescriptions.10  Interpretation of 
management's financial actions into financial statements was largely replaced with 
applying a comprehensive and extensive set of accounting and auditing rules to 
prepare those financial statements.  Unfortunately, this approach has allowed 
corrupt financial executives to also read the rules and find the loopholes or 
understand the weaknesses in the GAAP model and circumvent them.    
There are two major reasons that rule-making came to predominate in the U.S. 
accounting profession.  One was to show government agencies, such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), that the rules of accounting practice 
were being addressed by the profession.  Still the enactment of the Securities Acts 
                                                 
9 George O. May was a senior partner of Price Waterhouse & Company for almost thirty 
years and a well-respected accounting practitioner.  He was the first chairman of the 
Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP) of the American Institute of Accountants.  
CAP influenced the formulation of early U.S. accounting principles.  He authored over 
a hundred articles that can be traced back to 1906 in the Journal of Accountancy, and 
thus he exercised a strong voice in influencing accounting practices.   
10 In 1964, the AICPA formed a committee known as the Special Committee.  The role 
of the Special Committee was to determine how departures from AICPA accounting 
standards in effect at the time should be handled.  The recommendations of the 
Special Committee and a vote of the AICPA resulted in changing the manner in which 
accounting pronouncements were applied in practice.  Prior to the vote 
pronouncements were considered important, but not important enough to override the 
auditor's best judgment.  After the vote, accounting rules were considered 
authoritative.   
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have always created the fear the SEC would hand down accounting principles 
through "bureaucratic edict" (Brewster 2003).  Another reason was the generally 
perceived notion that closely following accounting rules would reduce an 
accounting firm's legal liability arising from undiscovered financial malfeasance of 
a corporate client.  It was argued that if the rules were closely followed such a 
practice would provide for the legal protection of the accounting profession.11  The 
SEC has largely allowed the profession to set accounting and auditing standards 
until recently, but the profession has not been successful in avoiding the damaging 
liability lawsuits arising from their corporate client’s fraudulent activities.   
4. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION:  FORENSIC AUDITS 
Auditor’s legal liabilities for not discovering their client's fraudulent financial 
actions are simply not going to disappear.  It is hard to understand how the liability 
for undiscovered frauds or other malfeasance can be reduced by continuing to 
strongly rely on the present rule-based, audit-reporting model.   When forensic 
accounting practices are incorporated into a separate forensic audit, they have the 
potential to overcome problems associated with identifying financial malfeasance 
within the traditional audit-reporting model. 
Recently, the Big Four along with Grant Thornton and BDO International released 
a white paper entitled “Serving Global Capital Markets and the Global Economy” 
herein the "Global Report" (Global Public Policy Symposium 2006).    The Global 
Report is concerned with the legal liabilities accounting firms are facing from a 
host of expanding lawsuits based on stockholders’ and others’ losses from after-
audit negative financial events such as fraud.  To counter this hostile legal climate 
and protect the firms from liabilities judgments, the Global Report’s authors 
suggest that all public companies have forensic audits.  The writers of the Global 
Report place forensic audits under the practices of the traditional audit-reporting 
model and view a forensic audit as a fraud examination.  Under those conditions, 
such a periodic "forensic audit" would be time consuming and expensive as noted 
in the Global Report.   
Yet, forensic audits do not have to be part of the traditional audit-reporting model.  
Although the objectives and definition of a forensic audit have not been clearly 
defined in the Global Report, here a forensic audit is considered to be an 
application of methodologies and technologies by an independent entity used to 
obtain a detailed understanding of the underlying economic risks facing an 
organization.12  Today's technologies allow for cost effective means to 
                                                 
11This perspective does not allow for blindly following standards and principles and 
consequently being absolved from all legal liability (See Tinker 1986, p. 105). 
12The PCAOB has stated that "forensic audits can be performed to achieve various 
objectives and can include a variety of different procedures" (Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board 2007b). Thus, forensic audits have been discussed but 
not defined in any set of established auditing standards.  See: 
(www.pcaobus.org/Standards/Standing_Advisory_Group/Meetings/2007/02-
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continuously monitor (not spot check) corporate activities under forensic audit 
practices.13  The Global Report is written as a defense of the accounting profession 
and opposes large legal settlements against accounting firms, but the Global 
Report's call for forensic audits should be viewed as a first strategic step to 
integrate principles-based GAAP and risk assurance.     
5. CONCEPTUAL BASIS: FORENSICS ACCOUNTING, FRAUD 
EXAMINATION, AND AUDITS 
Before describing the professional practices followed in forensic auditing, the 
contrasting concepts underlying forensic accounting, fraud examinations, and 
traditional auditing need to be briefly compared.  Forensic accounting proactively 
integrates accounting, criminology, computer forensics (investigations), litigation 
services, and auditing investigative services into the investigation of a broad range 
of future-oriented business problems as shown in Figure 1 (Smith and Crumbley 
2009) .  Areas of investigation in forensic accounting are broad and include fraud 
examination, due diligence reviews, risk assessment, detection of financial 
statement misrepresentation, cybercrimes, illegal money transfers, modeling risk 
                                                                                                                      
22/Forensic_Audit_Procedures.pdf.).  Also 
(http://www.cfonet.com/article.cfm/8759510?f=search) 
13 Beyond data mining software, such as ACL (http://www.acl.com) and IDEA 
(http://www.audimation.com), there are a number of software programs that can used 
to analyze the risks facing an organization.  For examples of cost effective continuous 
monitoring see:  (1) Confident Compliance 
(https://www.itcinstitute.org/display.aspx?id=347) a software package that 
continuously monitors process controls such as transaction rules in an organization.  
Such a technology approach reduces the cost of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley 
statutes.  (2) Visual Analytics' software package called Visual Links 
(http://www.visualanalytics.com) uses a graphical screen to uncover patterns, 
associations, and relationships among masses of unrelated data.  (3) Maltego 
(http://www.paterva.com/web2/maltego/maltego-2.html)is a software monitoring 
program used to establish links between corporate employees and others with whom 
they communicate to determine if they are violating corporate guidelines.  (4) ISYS 
Search Software (http://www.isys-search.com) used to make forensic searches of e-
mails and information on hard drives over the entire intranet. (5) RFID technologies 
that raise alerts when company notebooks are removed from company premises. (6) 
NetMap Analytics (http://www.netmapanalytics.com)used for mapping unrecognized 
relationships by mapping common links.  (7) SpectorSoft CNE Investigator 
(http://www.spectorcne.com) surveillance software that records everything that 
employees do on the Internet.  (8)  PyFlag (http://www.pyflag.net) is a tool that is used 
to analyze large volumes of log files.  Background arguments for using these 
approaches can be found in the paper:  Empowering Board Audit Committees: 
Electronic Discovery to Facilitate Corporate Fraud Detection (Michaud, Dutton, and 
Magaram 2006).  The authors recommend the continuous monitoring of e-mail 
messages within a corporation.  Once an activity was identified as possibly fraudulent, 
additional authorization would be needed to forensically examine any electronic 
evidence.  For examples of computer forensic software see the Buyer's Guide to 
Audit, Anti-Fraud, and Assurance Software (Brooks, Goldman and Lanza 2007).   
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assessment, and the identification of earnings management.14   
The study of criminology represented in Figure 1 deals with theories that cause 
crime to develop, such as conflict theory, natural choice theory, and social control 
theories.  Topics include corporate crime, corporate culture reviews, and interview 
techniques.15  The circle represented by accounting is the basic accounting and 
financial understandings and the foundational skills students develop as they 
advance through their undergraduate university accounting courses. This basic skill 
set allows students to enter a fraud/forensic curriculum.  The next skill set in 
Figure 1 is investigative auditing.  In this representation, fraud examination is 
considered to be part of investigative auditing along with the traditional 
investigative auditing areas centered on transaction analysis applied within 
inventory fraud or cash theft, for example.  Also included in Figure 1 is a litigation 
skill set.  Litigation  includes the ability to understand the discovery process, rules 
of evidence at the Federal and state levels, the difference between civil and 
criminal proceedings, differences between being an attorney in the courtroom 
compared to being an accountant, acting as expert witness, valuation services, and 
preparing electronic data for trial.  Finally accounting/computer forensic skills 
surround the other skill sets.  This skill set includes collecting and working with 
electronic data without compromising or destroying the data needed for an 
investigation.  In addition, it deals with an understanding electronic information 
risk and locating an electronic footprint used to create either bogus electronic or 
paper records, for example (Smith 2005).  Today developing such a skill set is 
important because “92 percent of new data is created electronically and 70 percent 
of that data never migrates to paper” (Kahan 2006). It is important to note that all 
the skills of the forensic accountant are applied when a forensic audit is performed. 
 Unlike forensic accounting, fraud examination is a reactive investigation launched 
to identify specific violations of fiduciary relationships based on an individual’s 
suspicions that a fraud has occurred or could occur.   Fraud investigations are 
singularly concerned with identifying a perpetrator and co-conspirators who 
benefited from fraudulent activities.  Such investigations include specific reviews 
of misrepresentations and concealment of material financial facts, cash larceny, 
payroll schemes, expense reimbursement schemes, inventory theft, bribery, and 
                                                 
14 For an example of the range of service that can be included under a definition of 
litigation service see: M. Wagner and P. Frank, Management Advisory Services 
Technical Consulting Practice Aid 7: Litigation Services, New York: AICPA, 1986.   
15 The guide, Managing the Risk of Fraud: A Practical Guide, herein the Guide, (Institute 
of Internal Auditors 2008) has outlined practices in fraud risk management programs.  
Although not calling for corporate culture reviews, the Guide stresses the importance 
of corporate culture in setting the ethical tone within an organization. 
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fraudulent financial statement schemes.16   Once the nature of the fraud is 
identified, these investigations become very transaction oriented.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Skill Sets in Forensic Accounting      
Financial auditing is based on providing periodic assurances that account balances 
are statistically and materially accurate, internal controls are adequate, and 
accounting rules are followed.  The perspective in an audit engagement is less 
adversarial than in a fraud or forensic investigation, and it is based on a series of 
rules and guidelines until recently issued by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) and currently by the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) for public companies.   Financial audits strongly rely 
on tests of internal financial controls to determine the extent of required transaction 
testing, and the financial audit is performed in a documented step-by-step fashion.  
Such an approach is necessary to issue an audit opinion and to show that properly 
documented procedures were followed in order to answer any after-audit legal 
                                                 
16 The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (http://www.acfe.com) supports fraud 
examination through its programs and provides training on topics such as those listed 
here.  The ACFE's website contains a full listing of fraud examination topics. 
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inquiries about the audit.  The audit becomes a rule-based process as somewhat 
legalistic practices are followed.  Table 1 highlights several differences between 
auditing, fraud examinations, and forensic accounting.  
    
Characteristic:  Audit Fraud 
Examination 
Forensic 
Accounting 
Time Perspective: Historical Historical Future and 
Historical 
Primary Focus: Periodic Reactive Proactive and 
Ongoing  
Investigation Scope: Narrow Narrow Broad Ranging 
Main Work Product is: Audit 
Opinion 
Fraud Case 
Report 
Forensic Audit 
Report 
Main Responsibility to: Company 
and Public 
Defrauded 
party 
Concerned 
principal or third 
party 
Guidelines are: Rules-
based 
Principles-
based; 
under audit 
rules, it is 
rule-based 
Principles-based 
Purpose of Report: Ensure 
GAAP is 
followed 
Identify 
perpetrator 
of fraud 
Fraud Risk 
Assessment and 
Strategic Services 
Professional Stance: Non-
adversarial 
Adversarial Adversarial and 
non-adversarial 
 
Table 1.  Contrasting Auditing, Fraud Examination, and Forensic Accounting 
 
In comparing audits, fraud examinations, and forensic accounting, it should be 
recognized that forensic accounting is forward-looking.  For example, a forensic 
analysis is used to determine anomalies by establishing a financial baseline and 
modeling deviations of projected results from the established baseline.  The 
forensic analysis is a continuous process that uses technology to identify suspicious 
activities occurring in company or other targeted environment.  In contrast, fraud 
examinations focus on the present and the past to determine how crimes were 
committed.  Similarly, audits review financial reporting in the past fiscal period, 
and in that sense, an audit is similar to fraud examination.  As, a singularly-focused 
subset, fraud examinations can easily fit within the scope of a traditional audit or a 
forensic audit.  
In summary, forensic accountants may be engaged in preventing or identifying 
fraud, but generally forensic accountants are employed in a much wider variety of 
risk management engagements.    
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6. FRAUD AND FORENSICS IN PRACTICE 
It is difficult for fraud examination and forensic accounting to effectively operate 
within the traditional auditor-client relationship.  Fraud and forensic approaches do 
not assume the client will honestly follow any of the detailed rules of GAAP or 
that an audit check-off list for revenue recognition, for example, will lead to the 
discovery of financial misconduct.      
When an independent fraud examination or forensic audit is performed, there is a 
high probability that an adversarial stance will be taken toward the subject of the 
investigation.   If either of these investigations fall under the annual periodic 
procedures of the financial audit, the mindset of forensic or fraud practitioner must 
change to correspond with financial auditor-client relationship.  As a result, 
forensic and fraud investigations must closely fit within the non-adversarial, step-
by-step procedural practice of a financial audit.  Such a change makes it difficult to 
apply the principle-based and flexible forensic and fraud techniques needed to 
identify the unpredictable criminal patterns used in committing and concealing 
financial crimes.   
Shortly after the Enron, World Com, and Xerox debacles, fraud examination was 
given recognition under audit practices.  Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 
No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit altered the general 
approach of the accounting profession toward fraud recognition.   SAS No. 99 was 
issued by the AICPA and went into effect on December 15, 2002.17   Under the 
SAS, the rules for fraud investigation were expanded, and the auditor is expected 
to display a heightened attitude of professional skepticism throughout the audit.  
The auditor must identify the risks of material misstatement in the financial reports 
and write up the results of the analysis.  Auditors must “brainstorm” to identify 
ways that fraud could be committed in the audited organization.  The number of 
managers and employees questioned under the new rules has been increased.  Yet 
all these fraud identification procedures are performed under the umbrella of a 
financial audit and its rule-based methodology.  Notably, SAS No. 99 does not 
refer to forensic accounting.18   Thus, the AICPA viewed fraud as closely related 
to financial audits; more so than forensics.  Fraud inquiries, in SAS No. 99, have a 
secondary role to the main audit engagement, and as a result, adversarial stances 
are muted under the auditor-client relationship.19     
                                                 
17Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. Statement on Auditing 
Standards Number 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (Effective 
date on or after: December 15, 2002).  AICPA, New York. SAS No. 99 supersedes SAS 
No. 82 which had superseded SAS No. 53 (issued in 1988). 
18 Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316.50, par .50 refers 
to "forensics" once when it mentions the use of  "forensic and information technology 
specialists."  The SAS mentions the term "fraud" three hundred and eighty-five times.   
19 Release No. 2007-001 from the PCAOB was issued in January 2007 five years after 
the issuance of SAS No. 99.  The Release adopted a critical tone regarding the 
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In 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 
response to corporate fraud.20   In light of the seemingly dismal record the AICPA 
had in establishing auditing standards to mitigate fraud scandals, SOX statutes took 
the role of setting auditing standards for public companies away from the AICPA 
and put it in the hands of the Public Corporation Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB).  The PCAOB is a semi-governmental board that operates under the 
purview of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).    
The PCAOB’s most recent audit guidance is found in Auditing Standard No. 5, 
(AS5) An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated 
with an Audit of Financial Statements.21  AS5 emphasizes the need to examine 
internal controls in making fraud risk assessments.  Thus, the PCAOB's 
pronouncements heavily rely on an examination of internal controls that basically 
mirror the methods followed in the SAS's previously issued by the AICPA.  It is 
not being argued here that internal controls should be ignored.  It is being argued 
that a strong and largely singular reliance on internal controls has not served as the 
means to significantly reducing corporate fraud and ensure that management's 
financial responsibilities toward corporate stakeholders are exercised.     
The main focus of professional standard setters has been to incorporate a measure 
of fraud examination into the audit environment.  At the present time, an audit 
engagement does not require the performance of any true forensic procedures.  
7. IMPLEMENTING THESE PRACTICES IN A FRAUD CASE 
The differences between the practices followed under audit, fraud examination, 
and a forensic audit can be examined through the review of a financial fraud.22  
The example chosen here is the Brightpoint fraud.  Brightpoint executives 
committed a financial fraud to hide a substantial decrease in annual profits.  The 
fraud involved a complex financial accounting conspiracy among high-level 
executives at two separate companies.  The executives were familiar with auditing 
rules and GAAP, and they developed a falsified transaction that would meet all the 
requirements of those guidelines.   
                                                                                                                      
manner in which auditing firms were implementing their fraud responsibilities under 
SAS No. 99.  For example, the PCAOB leveled criticism against the practice of using 
standard audit checklists as a means of checking for fraudulent corporate activities 
(Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 2007a). 
20 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PL 107-204, 116 Stat 745.  The act makes corporate 
officers responsible for earnings reports, forbids accounting firms from acting as 
consultants to accounting clients, and stiffens penalties for fraud. 
21Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Auditing Standard No. 5, An Audit of 
Internal Control over Financial Reporting That is Integrated with an Audit of Financial 
Statements (Effective June 12, 2007).Washington, D.C. 
22 The forensic methods described here are specifically related to the Brightpoint fraud, 
and although they provide an indication of the nature of a forensic audit, they should 
not be considered as composing the entire set of practices followed in a forensic 
audit. 
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Brightpoint, Inc. 
 
Brightpoint, Inc. is a firm with a global sales and distribution network of products such as handsets, 
PDAs, and software with total revenues of over $1 billion.  Phillip Bounsall, (Executive Vice 
President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer) John Delaney (Chief Accounting Officer and 
Controller), and Timothy Harcharik (Director of Risk Management) were Brightpoint's top 
executives involved in a "round trip" financial fraud in 1999.  In 1998, Brightpoint forecasted a $13 
to $18 million one-time charge against its 1998 revenues.   The charge was related to losses from 
the closure of Brightpoint's United Kingdom middle-man trading operations for their wireless 
products.  The loss was reported as follows in its 1998 annual report: 
 
Trading Charges 
 
Through the end of the third quarter of 1998, the Company had been engaged in the business of 
trading wireless handsets. Trading involves the purchase of wireless handsets from sources other 
than manufacturers or network operators (i.e., trading companies) and the sale of those handsets 
to purchasers other than network operators or their representatives (also trading companies). At 
the beginning of the fourth quarter of 1998 the Company decided to cease its trading activities 
primarily because: (i) those activities were not consistent with its strategy of emphasizing 
relationships with wireless equipment manufacturers and network operators, (ii) because the 
margins earned on the trading activities were rapidly decreasing and (iii) the Company had 
increasing concerns about the business practices of many trading companies. 
 
In connection with the discontinuance, the Company recorded a charge of approximately $17.7 
million ($13.8 million net of related tax benefits) in the fourth quarter of 1998. This charge included 
approximately $3.0 million for employee termination costs and other costs related to the 
discontinuation of the trading division. Additionally, certain assets that related to the trading division 
were determined by the Company to be impaired and, accordingly, were written down to their 
estimated fair value resulting in a charge of approximately $14.7 million. These assets included 
accounts receivable generated from sales to trading companies, inventory prepayments to trading 
companies and inventories purchased from trading companies. The impairment of these assets is 
a result of actions necessary to discontinue the trading division and certain activities carried out by 
individuals and third party trading companies in 1998 that were inconsistent with the best interests 
of the Company. 
 
Prior to the issuance of the annual report, it became obvious the trading loss was close to $29 
million.  In order to report the loss within the forecasted range in Brightpoint's 1999 annual report, 
Delaney and Harcharik purchased a "retroactive insurance" policy from American International 
Group, Inc. (AIG).  In 1999, the receivable on the policy was used in covering $12 million in 1998 
losses and show the reported loss within the forecasted range as well as hiding the round trip 
payment to AIG.  The result of the deception was an overstatement of Brightpoint's income before 
taxes by 61 percent. 
   
AIG is a large holding company whose subsidiaries sell a wide range of insurance products.  
Brightpoint negotiated an indemnity insurance policy in January 1999 with an AIG subsidiary.  All 
the policy documents were pre-dated to August 1, 1998.  The insurance policy was specifically 
structured to smooth annual income.   
 
Phillip Bounsall, Brightpoint's Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, and Treasurer, was 
aware and concurred with these financial misstatements.  In 1996, Bounsall had stock options 
exercisable that could have been worth $713,152 if the stock values appreciated 10%.  If the 1998 
trading loss was recognized, his stock options would have lost significant value.  The bonuses 
were based on profitability targets, revenue growth, and increases in stockholder value, all of which 
would be seriously affected if there were a 61% decrease in operating profit from the UK closure.  
The entire purpose of this financial fraud was to enter into an insurance agreement whereby losses 
of approximately $12 million could be hidden from stockholders.     
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8. THE AUDIT 
On the surface and from the auditors' view, Brightpoint's insurance policy had been 
in effect for six months prior to the close of 1998 fiscal period, and the policy 
provided up to $15 million of coverage for the UK loss.  The three-year policy was 
written to require monthly premium payments.  In actuality, no monthly payments 
were paid as the monthly premiums were prepaid.  Consequently, the sham 
transaction in reality was one where Brightpoint paid AIG $15 million, and then 
AIG made a "payment" to Brightpoint for its loss.  Brightpoint simply made a 
deposit to AIG and then received it back.  AIG received an upfront fee of over 
$300,000 for its service.  AIG and Brightpoint conspired to make the accounting 
documentation follow GAAP and consequently showing the insurance payment as 
a reduction of the trading loss.  The payout from the retroactive policy was used to 
reduce the UK loss by close to $12 million.  
Delaney and Harcharik engaged in a number of steps with AIG to successfully fool 
Brightpoint's auditors and stockholders regarding the true extent of the loss in 
financial statements prepared for the years 1999 through 2003.  The first step they 
took was to develop documentation from AIG, and with AIG's cooperation, 
showing that although recoveries were not certain they were highly probable.  
Highly probable is the GAAP term that is required to consider the receivable on 
the policy as offset against the trading loss.23  Other documentation included a 
letter of credit for $7.5 million from AIG, which was not needed but was useful in 
documenting GAAP requirements for the auditors.  In actuality, there was no 
credit granted by AIG nor did AIG take any financial risk under the arrangement.  
Accounting guidelines also require that the policy must also transfer some of the 
risk of loss from the insured to the insurance provider.24  If these two conditions 
are not met, payments to the insurer are considered deposits and payments to the 
insured are returns of deposits, not reimbursements for insurance losses.     
In order to further confuse Brightpoint's auditors, the sham payments to AIG were 
supposedly made for the purchase of two types of insurance intermingled within 
the one insurance policy.  One portion of the policy provided no exclusions and 
wide coverage for losses of up to $15 million.  The second portion of the policy 
had a $15 million per loss limit along with a number of collection exclusions and 
restrictions.  The second portion of the policy, which would never be used, was set 
                                                 
23 Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 5, Accounting for 
Contingencies (March 1975), ¶44, Payments to Insurance Companies That May Not 
Involve Transfer of Risk. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Norwalk, CT. 
24 Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 5, Accounting for 
Contingencies (March 1975), ¶45, Payments to Insurance Companies That May Not 
Involve Transfer of Risk. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Norwalk, CT. 
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up to further the appearance of a risk transfer to the insurer as required under 
Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 5.  Brightpoint's sham 
advance "premium" payments for the contract covered both portions of the policy; 
thus making it difficult to determine the portion of the payment that should be 
allocated to each portion of the policy.    
The first portion of the policy was the only reason for negotiating the policy, i.e., a 
return of the $15 million.  The $15 million deposit with AIG was accounted for by 
Brightpoint as insurance premium payment in 1998 and loss recoveries receivable 
in order to reduce the 1998 loss. To further make the policy palpable to the 
auditors and less likely to be considered a deposit, there was no stipulation in the 
contract for a premium reimbursement for not making claims under the policy.  
The auditor's issued a "clean" opinion on Brightpoint's 1998 financial statements.   
9. THE FRAUD EXAMINATION 
Under subpoena pressure and a primarily investigation from the SEC in 2002 (see: 
Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11251, In the matter of Brightpoint, Inc. 
Respondent), the "fraud examination" was begun by Brightpoint's auditors to 
determine what had occurred.  After conducting a transaction-based fraud 
examination, Brightpoint's auditors required a restatement of Brightpoint's 
financial statements in 2001, and a second restatement in 2002.  The first 
restatement required the entire $15.3 million paid to AIG be recognized as expense 
in the fourth quarter of 1998.  The second restatement in 2002 required the 
disclosure of the deposit nature of the "premiums," essentially requiring the entire 
1998 loss be recognized in the restated financial statements.  The fraud 
examination conducted by the auditors was a transaction-based investigation to 
uncover the nature of the fraud and specifically related to the one event. 
10. THE FORENSIC AUDIT 
Fraud examinations can be part of a forensic audit or conducted separately.  In the 
Brightpoint case, the fraud examination was not part of a forensic audit; therefore, 
no proactive forensic accounting procedures had been performed prior to the start 
of the fraud examination instituted by the auditors.  Yet, forensic practices could 
have been used to curtail and identify the Brightpoint fraud.  Forensic audit 
practices are expected to follow those principles that will best uncover the true 
economic risks occurring in a company.  These methods are expected to begin 
before there is any hint of financial malfeasance in the organization and to be 
successful they must be continuous in nature.25  Unlike the financial audit or the 
fraud examination that is performed under PCAOB or SAS guidelines, there is no 
                                                 
25 The guide, Managing the Risk of Fraud: A Practical Guide (Institute of Internal 
Auditors 2008) outlines the procedures that should be followed in a fraud risk 
management programs.  The Guide describes proactive approaches and continuous 
monitoring as important characteristics of a company's fraud risk management 
program.   
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book of rules for the forensic accountant to follow.  Forensic practices must 
proceed in the manner that can best detect, stop, and collect evidence about fraud 
or unethical activities.   
Prior to the start of the fraud examination by the auditors, internal controls within 
AIG and Brightpoint had been overridden by high-level executives in both 
companies; thus fooling the auditors.  In this case, internal controls did not have 
any effect on preventing the fraud due to the managerial authority held by the co-
conspirators.   According to official documents, the fraud was unraveled when the 
SEC's staff issued a subpoena to the Brightpoint's auditors.  With the knowledge 
that AIG-Brightpoint transactions were under investigation by the SEC, the co-
conspirators attempted to hide their business transactions.    
If forensic auditing had been used, the first step would be to conduct a review of 
Brightpoint's business culture.  The result of such a review determines the level of 
monitoring that continuously occurs within Brightpoint.    Such base-level 
monitoring would increase as targeted events occur within an organization.  One 
such targeted event is the disposal of a business segment.  Figure 2 illustrates the 
possible organizational relationship that could have been implemented between 
Brightpoint and a forensic service firm.  The firm providing forensic auditing 
services should be completely independent from Brightpoint, and its employees 
should not perform their duties within any of Brightpoint's physical facilities.  The 
forensic services firm's communication with Brightpoint is with selected members 
of Brightpoint's Board of Directors.  Communications are limited to prevent any 
details about an investigation from be circulated among top-level managers and 
possible fraud conspirators.  The forensic firm should not have any direct contact 
with individual executives at Brightpoint to prevent these managers from having 
any detailed knowledge about the forensic firm's monitoring and investigation 
activities.   
With Brightpoint, digital monitoring would have been heightened with the 
forthcoming disposal of the UK division.  The result would have been increased 
logging by digital forensic investigators of electronic data including e-mail 
traffic.26   In the actual case, only with subpoena power was the SEC able to collect 
the following two e-mails from Delaney sent to Harcharik:27 
                                                 
26 It would be expected that thousands of e-mails would need to be sorted through in 
order to find suspicious e-mails that attract the attention of the digital forensic 
investigators and members of the forensic fraud team.  The preliminary review is 
automated.  For example, the term “destroyed” in the second Delaney e-mail would 
result in the e-mail being logged and set aside for further reviewed by a forensic 
investigator.  Such a review would involve an analysis of cross linked messages 
related to this e-mail.   
27Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 8284, September 11, 2003; Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, Release No. 48474, September 11, 2003; Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement, Release No. 1854, September 11, 2003; and Administrative Proceeding 
File No. 3-11251.  In the Matter of Brightpoint, Inc., Respondent.  Order Instituting 
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"I need to support for [the Auditors] the recording of an 
insurance receivable related to the losses in the UK (in the 
amount of $12MM--Whoa)" 
 
"The binder you signed (I looked at it again) has January 6, 
1999 (in one case 1998) all over it.  This is not good and that 
copy must be destroyed and [sic] with an August date 
executed." 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Forensic Services Firm Hierarchy with Brightpoint 
  
 
                                                                                                                      
Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist 
Order Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21C of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as to Brightpoint, Inc.    
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Unlike a financial audit, forensic auditing is not a periodic event.  It is an ongoing 
process.  Under a forensic audit, digital communications and documentation is 
independently and continuously reviewed by digital forensic investigators to 
identify any suspicious activity.  Figure 2 illustrates the role digital forensic 
investigators play in a forensic audit of Brightpoint.  Electronic data is collected 
from the company's LAN and includes e-mails or employee website activity used 
to identify potential fraudulent activity.  Under such reviews, the previous two e-
mails would have red-flagged the executive's activities.28   At that point, selected 
members of a fraud response team would meet in emergency session to mitigate 
the fallout and damages to the company from the fraud.  At a minimum, such a 
fraud response team should be composed of a chief investigator, external auditor, 
external attorney, internal company attorney, human resources officer, forensic 
accountant, public relations consultant, and several digital forensic investigators. 
Digital investigators along with the forensic accountants are responsible for 
convening the entire fraud response team when fraudulent activities are detected, 
such as the e-mails from Delaney.29    
If forensic tools and practices had been used in this case, they would include the 
logged e-mails of all top company executives.30  The level of e-mail privacy needs 
to be inversely related to the organizational authority of company managers 
because high-level managers have the ability to override traditional internal 
controls with relative ease.    
11. CONCLUSION 
The argument being made here is that it is not unreasonable to consider 
alternatives such as forensic audits to help provide stakeholders with assurances 
about the economic risks a company is facing.   Such a step is especially important 
as the U.S. changes from a GAAP system strongly based on rules to one based on 
accounting principles.   
                                                 
28 The reviews of electronic company documents go beyond the collection of e-mails.  
As the vast majority of business activities create an electronic footprint, the review of 
these business events allows insights into financial incidents that are otherwise 
unavailable.  Under electronic monitoring, logs are collected and analyzed to provide 
information about the approval process for new vendors or claims for returned goods, 
for example.  As a consequence, electronic authorizations can be immediately 
compared with the IP address on computers (or other devices) making the 
authorization with the IP address on computers pre-approved to make these changes.  
Further, funding authorizations can be evaluated for any dollar amount not just those 
above threshold spending levels.   
29 Under a forensic audit engagement, it is probable the activities of the co-conspirators 
would have been uncovered before these two e-mails were sent. 
30 In the United States, but not every other country, a company’s property rights preempt 
an employee’s privacy rights.  An employer exercises a high level of control over an 
employees in the workplace based on the employment agreement whereby the 
employee is not required to work for the employer, but once a position of employment 
is accepted then the employee must follow workplace rules (Eltis 2003). 
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Forensics and fraud practices have commonalities of interest.  Both approaches 
must apply a mindset that does not easily fit within the audit environment.  But, 
fraud is a more specific and limited examination.  Forensics is broader, and it fits 
into a principles-based environment.   The Global Report closes with the call, “Let 
us begin the conversation” (Global Public Policy Symposium 2006).  We hope this 
article adds to the necessary dialogue.   
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